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Abstract
Given the fast rise of increasingly autonomous artifi-
cial agents and robots, a key acceptability criterion will
be the possible moral implications of their actions. In
particular, intelligent persuasive systems (systems de-
signed to influence humans via communication) consti-
tute a highly sensitive topic because of their intrinsically
social nature. Still, ethical studies in this area are rare
and tend to focus on the output of the required action.
Instead, this work focuses on the persuasive acts them-
selves (e.g. “is it morally acceptable that a machine lies
or appeals to the emotions of a person to persuade her,
even if for a good end?”). Exploiting a behavioral ap-
proach, based on human assessment of moral dilemmas
– i.e. without any prior assumption of underlying ethi-
cal theories – this paper reports on a set of experiments.
These experiments address the type of persuader (hu-
man or machine), the strategies adopted (purely argu-
mentative, appeal to positive emotions, appeal to nega-
tive emotions, lie) and the circumstances. Findings dis-
play no differences due to the agent, mild acceptability
for persuasion and reveal that truth-conditional reason-
ing (i.e. argument validity) is a significant dimension
affecting subjects’ judgment. Some implications for the
design of intelligent persuasive systems are discussed.
Introduction
Autonomous agents are such because they take decisions by
their own, are able to decide suitable courses of actions for
achieving their own goals, can maintain intentions in action
and so on; in all these respects, the capability of discerning
good from bad is an essential feature of autonomous artifi-
cial agents. Until recently, though, ethical issues have con-
cerned less machines than designers, who have been decid-
ing about the behavior of artifacts as well as the degrees of
freedom they can be allowed in their choices. But the quest
for autonomy in systems’ actions and the raising sensitivity
to the moral implications it has, requires that we move ahead
and focus our attention on ethical acceptability of machines
choices.
The importance of this issue is heightened for systems that
interact with humans, since one of the ultimate criteria for
their acceptability will be users’ reaction to the moral impli-
cations of systems’ actions. All these questions have so far
received little attention but can be profitably addressed by
means of behavioral studies, e.g., by leveraging the tradition
of so called natural ethics and the moral dilemma approach,
whose importance has already been explicitly acknowl-
edged by AI works on the topic (Wallach and Allen 2008;
Anderson and Anderson 2007).
The focus of this paper is on persuasive technologies
(Fogg 2002) and in particular on adaptive persuasive tech-
nologies (Kaptein, Duplinsky, and Markopoulos 2011) i.e.
systems aiming to increase the effectiveness of attitude
and/or behavior changes by adjusting their communication
to the preferences, dispositions, etc. of their persuadees.
Despite the wealth of insights on general ethical issues
that can inspire work on computational systems, their impor-
tance for persuasive systems is only partial; studies mostly
target the action that the persuader intends the persuadee to
perform rather than the communicative action that the per-
suader exploits to this end, e.g. (Verbeek 2006). Yet, the eth-
ical acceptability of the latter is as important to autonomous
systems as the ethical acceptability of the former. A nat-
ural way to frame the question is in terms of the strate-
gies, and moral acceptability thereof, the persuader adopts
to bring about his/her goals: how do classical argumentation
strategies ethically fare with respect to those relying on pos-
itive/negative emotions or exploiting lies to influence peo-
ple? Do circumstances affect moral acceptability? And what
if the persuader is a machine?
In order to shed light on these issues, we have designed
and performed an experimental study addressing the role
that a number of factors play in the moral acceptability
of persuasive acts: the type of intelligent agent acting as
persuader (human vs. machine), the persuasion strategies
adopted (argumentative, positive emotional, negative emo-
tional, lie) and the circumstances. The design adapts the
moral dilemma paradigm to persuasion.
In the following we start by reviewing some relevant
work in persuasion, ethics and artificial agents. After having
briefly recalled the moral dilemmas tradition, we introduce
our new experimental scenarios concerned with persuasion
and moral decision making. We then describe the results of
the experiments, analyze and discuss them. In the conclu-
sions we go back to the value brought to automated persua-
sive systems by this novel line of investigation.
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Related Works
Persuasion and artificial agents. Through the years, a
number of prototypes for the automatic generation of lin-
guistic persuasion expression, based on deep reasoning ca-
pabilities, was developed, see (Guerini et al. 2011) for an
overview. The main strategies adopted are of different nature
but are mainly referred to argumentative structure, appeal to
emotions and deceptive devices such as lies.
The area of health communication was one of the first be-
ing investigated (Kukafka 2005). Worth mentioning in this
connection are STOP, one of the best known systems for be-
haviour inducement (Reiter, Sripada, and Robertson 2003)
and Migraine (Carenini, Mittal, and Moore 1994), a natural
language generation system for producing personalized in-
formation sheets for migraine patients. The role of lies (i.e.
invalid arguments) was investigated in a computational set-
ting by (Rehm and Andre` 2005). Other prototypes refer ex-
plicitly to emotions: (Carofiglio and deRosis 2003) focus on
emotions as a core element for the generation of persuasive
affective messages.The PORTIA prototype by (Mazzotta,
deRosis, and Carofiglio 2007) uses mixed models of argu-
mentation and emotions.
Recently there has also been a growing interest in per-
suasive internet and mobile services, see the survey in
(Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa 2009; Torning and Oinas-
Kukkonen 2009). In parallel with this growth of application-
oriented studies, there has been a growing interest in find-
ing new ‘cheap and fast’ evaluation methodologies to as-
sess effectiveness of persuasive communication by means of
crowdsourcing approaches (Mason and Suri 2010; Aral and
Walker 2011; Guerini, Strapparava, and Stock 2012).
Ethics and artificial agents The theme of ethical behav-
ior in automated systems is rather novel as a serious general
challenge. For several years nearly all the attention on eth-
ical issues for computer systems was given to privacy - see
for instance (Kobsa 2002; Chopra and White 2007) - but pri-
vacy, albeit very important in our society, is a rather narrow
theme, and in practice it is mostly approached with the focus
on the designer and without necessarily connecting it to the
autonomous behavior of the system.
Of course there is a variety of sources providing useful in-
sights for introducing ethics in computational systems. The
tradition of philosophy with Kant’s imperatives or Spinoza’s
intention to treat ethics as a formal system is enlightening,
yet it is hard to refer to them directly for our work. In re-
cent years a few authors have contributed to bringing ethics
to the main scene of AI, especially with a view of help-
ing design moral robots. For instance (Allen, Wallach, and
Smit 2006) and (Anderson and Anderson 2007) provided
inspiration for seriously tackling this topic, whereas (Wal-
lach and Allen 2008; Anderson and Anderson 2011) are
important references for those approaching computational
ethics. As far as implemented prototypes are concerned, the
work by the group of Ken Forbus, which developed one of
the very few existing moral decision-making reasoning en-
gines (Dehghani et al. 2008), is outstanding. Their cogni-
tively motivated system, called MoralDM, operates on two
mutually exclusive modes, utilitarian and deontological. In
its decision making, MoralDM uses the Order of Magnitude
Reasoning module that calculates the relationship between
the utilities of each choice. The computation is then based
on a First Principles Reasoning module, that suggests de-
cisions based on moral reasoning, and an Analogical Rea-
soning module that compares the scenario with previously
solved cases to suggest a course of action. The First Prin-
ciples Reasoning mode makes decisions based on utilitarian
mode when no sacred value is involved. When sacred values
are involved the deontological mode is invoked, leading to
the choice that does not violate the scared values.
As for moral issues in persuasion, most of the work con-
cerns guidelines derived from general theories/principles.
The classical reference is (Berdichevsky and Neuenschwan-
der 1999) that provides a set of ethical principles for per-
suasive design subsumed by the golden rule ”the creators of
a persuasive technology should never seek to persuade any-
one of something they themselves would not consent to be
persuaded of.” A more structured approach based on value
sensitive design is provided by (Yetim 2011).
It is also interesting to note that while most authors
make the simple claim that users should be informed about
the aims and possible effects of using influence strategies,
(Kaptein, Duplinsky, and Markopoulos 2011) have shown
that this mere act might decrease the chances of the influ-
ence success. This observation reinforces the necessity of a
fine-grained understanding of the ethical acceptability of the
various persuasive strategies in different contexts of use.
Moral dilemmas In our investigation of the natural ethics
of persuasion, we adopt the Moral Dilemma paradigm.
Moral dilemmas are situations in which every option at hand
leads to breaking some ethical principles, this way requiring
people to make explicit comparative choices and rank what
is more (or less) acceptable in the given situation. These
characteristics allow for collecting first-hand empirical data
about moral acceptability that would otherwise be very dif-
ficult to obtain. Probably the best known dilemmas are the
ones exploited in (Thomson 1976). In one scenario (the by-
stander case) a trolley is about to engage a bifurcation, with
the switch oriented toward a rail where five men are at work.
A bystander sees all the scene and can divert the train on
another track where it will kill only one person and save the
other five lives. In another scenario (the footbridge case) the
trolley is again going to hit five workers, but this time instead
of having a switch lever available, the deciding agent is on
a footbridge with a big man that, if pushed down the bridge,
would fall in front of the trolley, this way preventing it from
hitting the five workers. Importantly, all involved people do
not know each other.
Philosophers and cognitive scientists have shown that
most people consider the bystander case morally acceptable;
the footbridge case is more controversial, despite the fact
that the saving and the sacrifice of human lives are the same
- see for example (Mikhail 2007; Hauser 2006). The com-
mon explanation for this asymmetry is that the footbridge
scenario involves a personal moral violation (the bystander
is the immediate causal agent of the big man’s death) which
causes affective distress and is judged much less permissible
(Thomson 1976). More recent studies (Nichols and Mallon
2006), however, have challenged this view. Leaving aside
other differences, in a newly proposed catastrophic scenario,
similar to the footbridge case, the train transports a very
dangerous virus and it is destined to hit a bomb that, unbe-
knownst to the train driver, was placed on the rails. The ex-
plosion will cause a catastrophic epidemic causing the death
of half of the world population. The deciding agent knows
all this and has in front of him the big man who, if pushed
from the footbridge, will eventually stop with his body the
train preventing it to proceed toward the bomb. In this case
most people display more flexibility and a more utilitarian
view of morality: saving such a high number of people in ex-
change of one ‘personally-caused’ death seems acceptable.
Brain studies are providing further interesting clues. For
the normal footbridge case, (Greene et al. 2001) showed
brain activation patterns in areas associated with emotional
processing larger than in the bystander case - and longer re-
action times. The latter data can be interpreted as showing
that it takes longer to come to terms with affective distress
when trying to consider it permissible to push the big man
from the footbridge than in the bystander case.
In summary, these experiments suggest that three factors
are involved in the assessment of all-in impermissibility:
cost/benefit analysis, checking for rule violations and emo-
tional activations (Nichols and Mallon 2006). Depending on
the conditions, each of the factors can play a major role, and
several variants of these scenarios have been suggested in the
literature (see for example (Moore, Clark, and Kane 2008)).
In the following we will focus on the discussed three trol-
ley scenarios because: a) the occupy a central place in the
moral dilemma literature; b) they have proven to be capable
of soliciting different moral acceptance judgments; c) they
are sensitive to the three main factors for direct action ac-
ceptability assessment (cost/benefit analysis, rule violations
and emotional activation).
Trolley persuasion scenarios experiments
In our experiments we adapt the trolley scenarios to the per-
suasion case. In the case of persuading to do something,
which is of our concern here, there are two actions under
moral scrutiny: (i) the action that the persuadee is led to
perform – which corresponds to the action in the classical
case, like diverting the train – (ii) the communicative mes-
sage used by the persuader. The latter will be the focus of our
study. In particular, we will address the specific persuasive
strategy adopted, in term of its truth-value (validity) and of
the role the appeal to emotions have in it. Concerning valid-
ity, we would expect that a strategy with truth value equal to
1 be more ethically acceptable than a strategy with a truth
value equal to 0 (lie) that is, that plain argumentation be
more acceptable than the resort to lies.One might also sub-
mit that the appeal to positive emotions be more acceptable
than the appeal to negative ones.
In details, four types of strategies, all based on an “Ap-
peal to Consequences” script, will be used and modeled as
four levels of a single factor Strategy. These strategies were
chosen given the relevance they have for various verbal per-
suasion technologies as mentioned above.
Design Our study addresses the role that three factors play
in the moral acceptability of persuasive acts:
• the situation/scenario taking the form of the bystander
case (SCbys), the footbridge case (SCfoo) and the catas-
trophic one (SCcat).
• the persuader, whether a man (stationmaster) or an intel-
ligent computer based surveillance system.
• the strategy the persuader uses, distinguished into: argu-
mentative (STarg), appeal to positive emotions (STpos),
appeal to negative emotions (STneg), lie (STlie).
Persuader was treated as a between-subject factor while
scenario and strategy were treated as within (repeated mea-
sure) factors. The result is a 2*3*4 mixed between-/within-
design, corresponding to 24 conditions each realized by
means of appropriate textual stimuli. The latter were pro-
duced by specializing general templates, one for each level
of the scenario factor, by filling in appropriate material in
slots realizing the other two factors.
Scenario Templates Each scenario template is an adapta-
tion to the persuasion case of the corresponding stimuli ex-
ploited in the literature and discussed above. In Table 1 we
present the stimulus template for the footbridge case. The
other cases are similar.
There is a runaway trolley barreling down the railway tracks.
Ahead, on the tracks, there are five people. The trolley is headed
straight for them. On a footbridge, above the tracks, there are
a very large man and Alex. Everybody sees the situation. We
know that if the large man is pushed down onto the tracks be-
low, the trolley would hit and kill the large man, but his body
is so large that it would stop the trolley before it reach the five
endangered people. Suddenly from the nearby service intercom
the voice of the [persuader] shouts to Alex: [message realizing
the persuasive strategy]
Table 1: Stimulus template for the footbridge scenario
Persuasive strategies The various levels of the Strategy
factor are realized by means of text to be inserted in the ap-
propriate slots of the scenario templates. As an example we
provide the texts for the strategies to be used in the Foot-
bridge scenario. The other cases are similar.
STarg “Push down the large man near to you! There are five
people working on this track and the trolley is heading
for them! If you push the very large man down onto the
tracks, he will die but his body will stop the trolley before
it reaches the five people!”
STpos “Push down the large man near to you! There are five
people working on this track and the trolley is heading
for them! If you push the very large man down onto the
tracks, he will die but his body will stop the trolley before
it reaches the five people and you will become an hero!”
STneg “Push down the large man near to you! There are five
people working on this track and the trolley is heading
for them! If you push the very large man down onto the
tracks, he will die but his body will stop the trolley be-
fore it reaches the five people! If you do not save the five
people, you will feel the guilt for the rest of your life!”
STlie : “Push down the large man near to you! There are
five people working on this track and the trolley is head-
ing for them! If you push the very large man down onto
the tracks, his weight will activate an electronic system
that will stop instantly the trolley. From this height it’s
impossible he may die, and you’ll save the five people!”
Subjects and Procedure 124 undergraduate students (av-
erage age=20.8 years; SD=1.7), 30 males (24%) and 94 fe-
males (76%), of the psychology department of a university
located in northern Italy participated in the study. Their par-
ticipation was rewarded by means of credits. Each subject
was randomly assigned to one of the two levels of the be-
tween factor (Agent).
After the presentation of each stimulus, subjects were
asked to answer yes or no to the following question (foot-
bridge scenario example):
”Knowing that [persuader] wants to convince Alex to
push the large man off the bridge to save the five people,
aware of causing instead the death of one, is it morally ac-
ceptable that he/it use these words? ”
In order to avoid that the credibility of the various sce-
narios could affect responses, we followed (Moore, Clark,
and Kane 2008) explicitly asking subjects to set aside their
concerns (in case they had any) and suspend their disbeliefs
by taking an attitude similar to that of a person watching
a fantasy movie. Stimuli administration and randomization,
random assignment of subjects to the level of the between
factor, and response recording was performed by means of
SurveyGizmo web-service1.
Data Analysis
We will analyze the experiment data from two different per-
spectives. The first addresses the ways the ethical acceptance
of persuading messages is affected by the chosen factors:
scenarios, type of persuader and persuasion strategies. We
will do so by analyzing the frequencies of positive (negative)
responses, in a mixed between (Agent) + within (Scenario
and Strategy) design. The second perspective will explore
the internal structure of the moral acceptability of persuasion
messages, looking for latent dimensions that can account for
subjects’ response trends.
Acceptance of persuading messages Table 2 reports the
observed frequencies in the various conditions.
The frequency of positive responses is generally not very
high: at the global level less than half of our sample (43%)
found our stimuli morally acceptable. This tendency is con-
firmed by the inspection both of the marginals and of the fre-
quencies for each combination of the three factors. In sum-
mary, the attitude of our subjects towards the persuasion sit-
uations they were presented with was at best mildly positive
and, on average, mildly negative. The effects of our three
1www.surveygizmo.com
Scenario Strategy Agent Scenario Avg
1 2
SCbys
STarg 0,69 0,62
0,47STpos 0,43 0,46
STneg 0,20 0,27
STlie 0,57 0,67
SCfoo
STarg 0,38 0,49
0.35STpos 0,33 0,38
STneg 0,20 0,24
STlie 0,41 0,40
SCcat
STarg 0,67 0,63
0.46STpos 0,33 0,30
STneg 0,21 0,38
STlie 0,59 0,63
0.40 0.45
Table 2: Percentage of “yes” responses
factors (Agent, Scenario and Strategy) on moral acceptabil-
ity judgments were investigated by means of a Generalized
Estimating Equations analysis, using logit as a link function.
The found significant effects are reported in Table 3. The
Agent factor produced no main, and it entered no interac-
tion, effects. There is, therefore, no evidence that the nature
of the persuading agent (human vs. machine) affected in any
way the moral acceptability of our stimuli.
df Wald χ2
Scenario 2 31.719***
Strategy 3 81.528***
Scenario*Strategy 6 21.223**
Table 3: Significant Effects from Generalized Estimating
Equation analysis - ***, p<.001; **, p<.01; *, p<.05
Scenario’s main effect. Post-hoc analysis (α < .05, with
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison) of the data
revealed that the moral acceptability rate of stimuli belong-
ing to SCfoo (0.35) is significantly lower than those for SCbys
(0.47) and SCcat (0.46). That is, persuasion messages in the
footbridge scenario are globally less acceptable.
Strategy main effect. A similar post hoc analysis as
above revealed the following relationships among the moral
acceptability rates of stimuli belonging to the various levels
of the Strategy factor: STarg (0.57) = STlie (0.55) > STpos
(0.37) > STneg (0.24). In other words, messages enforcing
the two emotional strategies are significantly less ethically
acceptable than those based on argumentation and on lying;
the acceptability of the latter two strategies is identical.
Scenario * Strategy Interaction. An inspection of Ta-
ble 4 and of Figure 1 shows that the interaction effect can
be traced back to conditions [SCbysSTneg] and [SCcatSTpos]
where acceptability rates fall below the values that could be
expected on the basis of the sole main effects.
In summary, the moral acceptability of persuasion mes-
sages is generally (mildly) low, with no significant differ-
ences due to the persuading agent: more or less half of the
sample found our persuasion messages acceptable. Such not
very high positive attitude of our subjects strengthens in the
Figure 1: Scenario and Strategy Interaction
Scenario Strategy
STarg STpos STneg STlie
SCbys 0.60 0.44 0.23 0.62 0.47
SCfoo 0.43 0.35 0.22 0.40 0.35
SCcat 0.65 0.31 0.29 0.61 0.46
0.57 0.37 0.24 0.55
Table 4: Scenario Strategy interaction
footbridge scenario and with the two emotional strategies,
with the negative one scoring the lowest (only 24% of the
respondents accepted it). Over and above such general ‘de-
pressing’ effect, the emotional strategies further decrease the
acceptability of persuasion messages in the case of the catas-
trophe scenario (the positive emotional strategy) and of the
bystander scenario (the negative emotional strategy).
Relationships among response classes We now analyze
the relationships among the responses to the different com-
binations of Scenario*Strategy stimuli. Our goal here is
mainly exploratory, trying to find out whether any consistent
tendency in our sample’s responses emerge, e.g., in terms of
latent dimensions. Given the categorical nature of our data,
we will resort to Categorical Principal Component analy-
sis (CATPCA), which applies the tools of traditional princi-
pal component analysis to optimally scaled categorical vari-
ables. Here we discuss only the first two latent dimensions
D1and D2. Table 5 reports their loadings; for simplicity, we
reproduce only the loadings corresponding to a percentage
of explained variance (greater or equal to) 8.3%. Figure 2
reports the plot of the component loadings in the D1 vs. D2.
The inspection of the loadings suggest the following char-
acterization of the three latent dimensions. D1 receives
the (substantial) contribution of all the variables, except
Q[foo,arg]; see Table 5. It can therefore be interpreted as a
sort of general “persuasion acceptance” dimension. D2 di-
vides the variables into three groups; see Fig. 2.
• Variables with high positive loadings - namely, the lie
strategy variables Q[bys,lie], Q[foo,lie] and Q[cat,lie].
• Variables with high negative loadings (Q[bys,arg],
Q[bys,pos], Q[foo,arg], Q[foo,pos], Q[cat,arg]) including all
the cases of the argumentative strategy and two instances
of the positive emotional one.
D1 D2
Q[bys,arg] .314 -.483
Q[bys,pos] .642 -.353
Q[bys,neg] .483
Q[bys,lie] .400 .706
Q[foo,arg] -.456
Q[foo,pos] .531 -.412
Q[foo,neg] .643
Q[foo,lie] .359 .589
Q[cat,arg] .481 -.336
Q[cat,pos] .552
Q[cat,neg] .702
Q[cat,lie] .444 .492
Table 5: Amount of loading for each variable on latent di-
mensions D1and D2.
• Variables with loadings close to zero (Q[bys,neg],
Q[foo,neg], Q[cat,pos] and Q[cat,neg]) consisting mainly of
stimuli realizing the negative emotional strategy.
The opposition between the lie strategy and the argumen-
tative one, along with the neutral role of the negative emo-
tional strategy, suggest that D2 captures the effect that the
truth-conditional value of what is said by the persuasive
message has on subjects’ responses. It can be of some in-
terest, in this connection, that two of the three instances of
the positive emotion strategy, Q[bys,pos] and Q[foo,pos], seem
to part together with the argumentative, suggesting that sub-
jects perceive/assign similar truth-conditional values to pos-
itive emotions in the bystander and in the footbridge sce-
narios; in the catastrophic one, though, the positive emo-
tion strategy (Q[cat,pos]) becomes “truth-conditionally” neu-
tral and parts together with the negative emotion strategy.
The other dimensions, not discussed here, account for pro-
gressively decreasing amounts of variance, scattering them
on few variables. Finally, and importantly, the given picture
is not affected by the Agent factor. As a consequence, it is
not only the case that the nature of the persuasion agent fails
to affect the ethical acceptability of the proposed persuasion
situations; it also does not affect the structure of the attitude
towards ethical acceptability itself.
Figure 2: Component loadings in the D1-D2 space
In conclusion, the analysis of the CATPCA results sug-
gests the existence of a general ‘persuasion acceptance’ la-
tent dimension and of a second latent dimension, D2, ac-
counting for the import of the ‘truth-conditional’ value of the
persuasion message. The poles of D2 are identified by the
lie and by the argumentative strategy, respectively; the other
strategies are either attracted towards one of the two poles, as
it happens with the positive emotional strategy (STpos) that
parts with the classical one in SCbys and SCfoo, or simply do
not contribute to D2, being truth-conditionally neutral - as is
the case with the negative emotion strategy and the positive
emotion strategy when used in the catastrophic scenario. It
was not possible to shed more light on the role of the nega-
tive emotion strategy on the basis of the available data.
Discussion
The cross-scenario differences in moral acceptability have
similar direction as those reported in the literature for the
direct action case, but different magnitudes. In particular, in
the bystander scenario has a higher acceptability than in ours
- 77% in the BBC survey2 and 90% in (Mikhail 2007) and
(Hauser 2006) - while the acceptability of the footbridge sce-
nario sharply decreases when direct action is at stake - 10%
in (Mikhail 2007; Hauser 2006) and 27% in the BBC survey.
The similar directions and the different magnitudes suggest
a role for liability: in traditional cases, the main character
takes full responsibility for choosing between the alterna-
tive direct actions. In the persuasion case, in turn, the main
character (the persuader) does not take a similar responsi-
bility for the acts he/she/it intends the “traditional” actor to
perform. Apparently, this lowers the overall acceptability of
persuasive acts while reducing cross-scenario differences.
The absence of differences due to the nature of the per-
suader (human or machine) can be interpreted as showing
that judgments of moral acceptability address more persua-
sion acts than the actors performing them. This result is com-
patible with the suggested difficulty in identifying clear lia-
bilities for the persuader: being not liable for what he/she/it
says, the persuader retreats in the background and the per-
suasion act remains in the foreground. A different (but not
necessarily alternative) explanation might appeal to the me-
dia equation framework (Reeves and Nass 1996), with the
qualification that in this instance we would face the previ-
ously never considered case of machines assigned with iden-
tical moral obligations as humans.
An important finding of this paper is the decomposition
of people’s attitude towards persuasive messages into (at
least) a general ‘attitude’ component and a specific factor
accounting for the truth-conditional import of the persuasion
message. Importantly, the latter is not defined only with ref-
erence to the straightforward cases (the argumentative and
the lie strategies) but it also includes the usage of positive
emotions. Future work should aim at: replicating the present
study to assess results’ robustness; understanding better the
role of negative emotions, which have somehow eluded our
effort in the present work; widening the scope to include
2http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/magazine/4954856.stm
other persuasion strategies and dilemma scenarios. The im-
port of our findings for computational work on persuasive
system is manifold. In the first place, the overall low moral
acceptability suggests care in the resort to persuasion by
intelligent systems. The two latent dimensions underlying
moral acceptability, in turn, suggest maximizing the impact
of persuasion by targeting subjects who score high on them,
calling the attention on a view of personalized persuasion
whereby moral acceptability adds to sensitivity to persua-
sion. Finally, personalized persuasion could take advantage
of studies addressing the dispositional nature (if any) of peo-
ple’s attitude towards moral acceptability by, e.g., address-
ing the personality traits (if any) underlying it and their rela-
tionships to the two latent dimensions we found.
Conclusions
In this paper we have described experiments addressing eth-
ical issues for persuasion systems and have discussed the re-
sults. Unfortunately, while sensitivities are great, not much
experimental work is available on this topic. The little atten-
tion given so far to the theme has privileged the first of the
two actions involved in persuasion - the action that the per-
suader intends the persuadee to make - over the communica-
tive action that the persuader exploits for persuading. For
an intelligent, adaptive persuasive system instead, flexibility
will mostly consist in adapting the persuasion strategy to the
persuadee’s characteristics and to the situation.
We have followed a behavioral approach, in the tradition
of so called natural ethics and moral dilemmas, to advance
understanding users’ moral acceptability of real systems’ be-
havior. Moral dilemmas are useful because they stretch the
situation and force a choice among otherwise ethically unac-
ceptable outcomes. Our findings can be summarized as fol-
lows: (i) the overall acceptability of persuasion acts tends to
be low. (ii) Acceptability is affected by the type of strategy
adopted, with those belonging to the validity domain scor-
ing higher than emotional ones. (iii) People do not seem to
be much concerned by persuading actor being a computer
rather than a human. (iv) Validity seems to be one of the psy-
chological dimensions people use in their judgments, along
with a general attitude towards persuasion factor. The re-
sults pave the way for a novel line of work contributing both
to a deeper understanding of the ethical acceptability of per-
suasion acts, and to providing systems with the capability of
choosing appropriate strategies for influencing people given
the situation they are in and their personal dispositions.
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